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Two Practical Random-Subcarrier-Selection
Methods for Secure Precise Wireless Transmission
Tong Shen, Shuo Zhang, Riqing Chen, Jin Wang, Jinsong Hu, Feng Shu, and Jiangzhou Wang
Abstract—In directional modulation (DM) networks, two prac-
tical random-subcarrier-selection (RSS) methods are proposed
to transmit confidential message to the desired user per or-
thogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) symbol with
only single receive power peak formed by constructing random
subcarrier set and performing a randomization procedure. This
scheme completely addresses the crucial problem facing secure
precise wireless transmission (SPWT), how to achieve the SPWT
per OFDM symbol while the traditional SPWT holds only in
the statistically average sense. Several necessary conditions for
SPWT per OFDM is derived and proposed: random, distributed,
and distinct subcarrier spacing pattern mapped onto transmit
antenna array. Two random subcarrier index sets, quadratic sub-
carrier set (QSS) and prime subcarrier set (PSS), are constructed.
Subsequently, a random metric is defined, and a randomization
procedure (RP) is proposed. Its detailed process includes the
following steps: integer mod, ordering, blocking, and block
interleaving (BI) where BI is repeated until the random metric
is greater than the predefined value. This yields a single high
energy main peak (SHEMP) at the desired position with other
positions, outside the main peak, harvesting only weak receive
energy seriously corrupted by AN. Simulation results confirm
that our proposed two methods, QSS plus RP and PSS plus RP,
perform significantly better than conventional methods such as
linear subcarrier set (LSS) plus RP. They actually form a SHEMP
at desired position, and generate only extremely small leakage
outside the main peak.
Index Terms—Secure precise wireless transmission, direction
modulation, random subcarrier-selection, quadratic subcarrier
set, prime subcarrier set, randomization procedure
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security (PLS) in wireless networks is an
extremely important and challenging research field and has
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made a great progress in the last decade [1]–[13]. As an
efficient way for PLS wireless transmission, directional mod-
ulation (DM) has attracted extensive research interesting and
activities [14]–[20]. In [21], [22], the authors first proposed to
use artificial noise (AN) projection to degrade the performance
of eavesdropper with the help of multiple transmit antennas.
This opens a new way of PLS in wireless networks, which
also triggered the rapid development of PLS. In [14], the
authors proposes a DM array actively driven by utilizing
analog radio frequency phase shifters or switchers, but this
scheme has its weakness that it is difficult to design such a
high speed RF switchers or shifters and the complexity of
its design process is too high. To address this difficulty, the
authors in [15] proposed a DM synthesis scheme on baseband
with the help of orthogonal AN. In [16], [17], the authors
took direction measurement error into account and propose
two robust DM synthesis schemes with AN in single desired
user and multi-user scenarios respectively. This scheme can
significantly improve the bit error rate (BER) performance
in desired receivers compared with non-robust methods. In
a multi-user DM situation, without the prior knowledge of
measurement error distribution of directional angles, a main-
lobe-integration-based leakage beamformer is proposed to
realize the robust secure wireless transmission [23]. In multi-
cast scenario, a secure pre-coding method was proposed in [18]
with the aid of AN. In [19], given any precoder of confidential
messages and AN projection matrix, the authors proposed an
optimal power allocation strategy of maximizing the secrecy
rate in DM networks. With this strategy, the secrecy rate has
been greatly improved.
DM is a key-less and important transmit way of PLS,
but there also exists a serious secure problem. That is, the
beamforming method of DM only depends heavily on di-
rection but is independent of distance. It has the possibility
that the eavesdroppers move inside the main beam of the
desired user, implying that eavesdropper can readily intercept
the confidential messages from the channel. In such a scenario,
the DM can no longer guarantee the secure transmission of
confidential messages.
To overcome such a problem, in [25], the authors combined
random frequency diverse array (RFDA) in [26]–[28] and di-
rection modulation in [14], [15] to propose an excellent secure
transmission idea, called secure precise wireless transmission
(SPWT). In [29], the authors also proposed to achieve a SPWT
with the help of cooperative relays as a second way. The
SPWT is viewed as an emerging technology based on direction
modulation (DM). Its basis idea is to form a single high energy
main peak (SHEMP) at the desired position. If eavesdropper
2moves outside the peak, it only intercepts the weak receive
confidential signal severely corrupted by AN, and thus cannot
detect the confidential messages correctly. However, for a
SPWT of using RFDA plus DM, as the number N of antenna-
array elements tends to be medium-scale or large-scale, the
receiver requires N -RF chains to coherently combine the
transmit signals. In other words, the circuit complexity for
the desired receiver will become prohibitive. Therefore, in
[30], the authors proposed a SPWT transmit structure using
random subcarrier selection (RSS) of orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM) instead of RFDA with a low-
complexity receiver structure and orthogonal property among
random frequencies. This FFT/IFFT operation structure will
significantly simplify the circuit complexity and cost of co-
herent combination at receiver.
However, in both [30] and [25], they only proposed an
elementary idea: SPWT. Actually, in the two papers, a single
energy peak is formed at the desired position in the statistically
average sense, not a practical transmit way. How to achieve a
SPWT per OFDM symbol? That is, only single high energy
peak is produced at receive terminal per OFDM symbol. This
motivates us to propose some practical SPWT procedures. In
this paper, we focus mainly on the investigation of constructing
some practical SPWT schemes. Our main contributions are
summarized as follows:
1) Given a matched filtering precoder, which achieves a
phase alignment at desired position, to observe all phases
at undesired receiver, we find a fact that when NT
receive signal phases from NT transmit antennas are
uniformly and sparsely distributed over unit circle, NT
receive signals can be approximately cancelled each
other to avoid being intercepted, where NT is the
number of antennas at Alice. Additionally, the subcarrier
index spacings from two or more pairs of adjacent
transmit antennas should be made to be distinct in order
to avoid coherent combining at eavesdropper. Otherwise,
they form a energy gathering at eavesdropper with a
proper condition. Hence, NT subcarrier indices mapped
onto the corresponding transmit antennas should be
made to be random, distributed, and unequally-spaced.
2) First, we propose two random subcarrier index sets
(RSIS): quadratic subcarrier set (QSS) and prime subcar-
rier set (PSS). Also, linear subcarrier set (LSS) is used
as a performance benchmark. Their sizes will directly
affect the interception probability of eavesdropper. All
three sets may achieve an extremely interception proba-
bility by adjusting their parameters. For example, given
a fixed value of NT , increasing the RSIS sizes will result
in a lower interception probability. In other words, this
will achieve an improved anti-interception performance.
3) First, given a RSIS constructed by the above step, NT
subcarriers are randomly chosen from it, and mapped
onto the corresponding transmit antennas. To form a
sufficiently random mapping from the chosen NT sub-
carriers into NT transmit antennas, a random metric is
defined to measure the randomization of the NT sub-
carrier indices. Then, a randomization procedure (RP) is
proposed to optimize the random metric of the mapping.
The total process includes the following multiple steps:
mod arithmetic operation, ordering, blocking, and block
interleaving, where block interleaving is repeated until
the random metric is larger than a predefined value.
Simulation result verifies the fact that the proposed
procedure actually generates a high random metric. By
simulation, we find that QSS plus RP and PSS plus RP
can form single high energy main peak to achieve a
SPWT. It is very difficult for LSS plus RP to implement
SPWT.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model of SPWT systems with a linear
antenna array using RSIS scheme with the aid of AN. In
Section III, we give several necessary conditions to reach the
goal of SPWT. In Section IV, we firstly constructs two novel
RSISs: QSS and PSS. Then, a RP is proposed to achieve a
SPWT with SHEMP together with several very weak energy
side peaks severely corrupted by AN. In Section V, we make
our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In Fig.1, a block diagram of SPWT system is shown. Here,
Alice is equipped with a NT -element linear antenna array,
and all antennas of Alice transmit the same data symbol per
OFDM symbol towards Bob via randomly-selected multiple
subcarriers from all-subcarrier set of OFDM. It is assumed
that the set of NS orthogonal subcarriers for OFDM is defined
as follows
Ssub = {fm |fm = fc +m∆f, (m = 0, 1, . . .N − 1)} (1)
where fc is the central carrier frequency,m denotes the subcar-
rier index, i.e., the m-th subcarrier, and ∆f is the subchannel
bandwidth. In this paper, we assume that NS∆f ≪ c, the
subcarrier assigned to the n-th antenna is fn, where fn ∈ Ssub.
Then, the signal transmitted by antenna n can be represented
by
sn =
√
α1Psxe
jφn +
√
α2Pswn (2)
where x is the transmit data symbol with E {x∗x} = 1, wn
is the AN, Ps is the total transmit power for all antennas, α1
and α2 are the power allocation (PA) factors which satisfies
the identity equation constraint α1 + α2 = 1, and φn is the
initial phase.
In a far-field scenario and line-of-propagation (LoP) chan-
nel, the receiver is at arbitrary position (θ,R), where θ and R
are the angle and distance of the receiver position with respect
to the first element of transmit antenna array, respectively. In
this work, we choose the first antenna of the array as the
reference antenna, then the distance from the n-th antenna to
receiver can be expressed as Rn = R− (n− 1) d cos θ, where
d denotes the element spacing. we define the reference phase
as ϕ0 (θ,R) = 2pifc
R
c
and the phase shifting of the n-th
element as
ψn (θ,R) = 2pi (fc + kn∆f)Rn/c− ϕ0 (θ,R) (3)
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Fig. 1. Block diagram for SPWT systems.
So the received signal superimposed from all array elements
after down-converted can be given by
Y (θ,R) =
√
α1Psh
H
vx+
√
α2Psh
H
w+ n (4)
where
h =
[
ejψ1(θ,R), ejψ2(θ,R), . . . , ejψNT (θ,R)
]H
, (5)
v =
1√
NT
[
ejφ1 , ejφ2 , . . . , ejφNT
]H
, (6)
and n is the channel noise with the distribution of n ∼
CN (0, δ) and w is the AN. It is assumed that the desired
receiver (Bob) and eavesdroppers (Eve) equipped with single
antenna is located at (θB, RB), and (θE , RE), respectively.
In general, if Eve is a passive eavesdropper, its position is
unavailable for Alice and Bob. To coherently combine all NT
signals from NT antennas at Bob, the initial phase vector v
should be designed to meet the following identity equation
h
H
Bv = e
jφ0 (7)
where φ0 is a constant phase and hB is obtained by replacing
(θ,R) with (θB, RB). In accordance with (7), the initial phase
of antenna n should satisfy the following identity
φn − ψn (θB, RB) = φ0, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .NT } (8)
In particular, when the desired angle and distance are available,
a simple beamforming form vk = h is usually used, thus
φ0 = 0. Furthermore, the AN vector w should lie in the null
space of hB , which can be expressed as
w = (INT − hBhHB )z (9)
where z consists of i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex Gaus-
sian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance, i.e.,
z ∼ CN (0, INT ). Using the null-space projection of AN and
matched filter precoder of confidential messages, we have the
receive signal at Bob
YB (θB, RB) =
√
α1PshB
H
vx + nB =
√
α1Ps
√
NTx+ nB,
(10)
which yields the SINR at Bob as follows
SINRB =
α1PS
∣∣hHBv∣∣2
α2PS
∣∣hHBw∣∣2 + δ2
=
α1PS
δ2
, (11)
In the same manner, we have the receive signal at Eve
YE (θE , RE) =
√
α1PshE
H
vx +
√
α2PshE
H
w + nE ,
(12)
which yields the SINR at Eve as follows
SINRE =
α1PS
∣∣hHEv∣∣2
α2PS
∣∣hHEw∣∣2 + δ2
. (13)
According to (10) and (12), the original signal x can be readily
and successfully detected at Bob due to the array gain from
phase alignment. But for Eve, the amplitude and phase of
receive signal is seriously distorted and corrupted by AN. In
what follows, we will show how to construct a set of random
subcarriers and how to perform a RP on the subcarrier indices
assigned to all transmit antennas of Alice in order to make
all signals cancel each other at Eve. Using a mathematical
language, it is preferred that hE
H
v ≈ 0 in (12) such that Eve
has no chance to detect confidential messages successfully.
III. SEVERAL CRUCIAL SELECTION RULES FOR DESIGNING
RSS SET
In this section, we will derive some necessary conditions
to achieve a SPWT per OFDM. Our main conclusions are
as follows: random, distributed, and unequally-spaced for
subcarrier index pattern over transmit antenna array at Alice.
To discuss the SINR at the position of potential eavesdrop-
pers with a given desired user, we need find the correlation
between hE and hB , since hE is the only variable quantity.
First we rewrite (3) as
ψn (θ,R) ≈ 2pikn∆fR
c
− 2pifc (n− 1) d cos θ
c
(14)
since we have
2pikn∆f (n− 1) d cos θ
c
≈ 0 (15)
4due to the assumption that N∆f ≪ fc, where array element
spacing d is usually set to d = λ/2 where λ is the wavelength.
We find (13) is an increasing function of
∣∣hHEv∣∣, and
h
H
Ev =
1√
NT
NT∑
n=1
ej2pi[knpE−(n−1)qE ] (16)
where
pE =
∆f(RB − RE)
c
, (17)
and
qE =
fcd (cos θB − cos θE)
c
. (18)
We will find that each term in (16) is on unit circle in polar
coordinate system, as shown in Fig.2. When all angles of all
terms concentrate along one direction or closer, all receive
signals from NT transmit antennas superimpose constructively
to form an energy peak. Conversely, if these angles are
sparsely, and uniformly distributed on unit circle, all receive
signals will cancel each other. Finally, the entire receive
signal is such weak that the eavesdropper cannot intercept
confidential messages successfully. This will guarantee our
proposed SPWT per OFDM.
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Fig. 2. Schematic diagram of demonstrating the relationship among subcar-
riers, transmit antennas, and receivers.
In a special case that all phases of all terms on the right-side
hand of (16) are identical,
2pi[knpE − (n− 1) qE ] = θ0 + 2pim, (19)
which can be written as
kn =
(n− 1) qE + θ0 +m
pE
(20)
where the subcarrier index kn over antenna n is a linear
function of n given an integer value of m. In other words,
all signals across transmit antenna array is actually viewed as
a linear frequency modulation along spatial antenna direction.
At this point, all phases align at the undesired receiver. This
will forms a strong confidential energy peak, which will yield
a serious secure issue. This situation should be avoided.
Now, let us consider a general case, there are two pairs of
adjacent antennas and each pair has distinct subcarrier index
spacings, we have

2pi[kn1pE − (n1 − 1)qE ] = 2pi(ρ+m1), (21a)
2pi[(kn1 +∆k1)pE − n1qE ] = 2pi(ρ+m2), (21b)
2pi[kn2pE − (n2 − 1)qE ] = 2pi(ρ+m3), (21c)
2pi[(kn2 +∆k2)pE − n2qE ] = 2pi(ρ+m4) (21d)
where ρ is the initial phase with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, kn1 , kn2 stand
for the subcarrier indices mapped onto antennas n1-th and the
n2, and ∆k1 and ∆k2 denote the subcarrier index spacings of
the two pairs. From the above, by (21b) minus (21a), (21c)
minus (21b), and (21d) minus (21c), we have

∆k1pE − qE = m2 −m1, (22a)
∆k′pE − (n2 − n1 − 1)qE = m3 −m2, (22b)
∆k2pE − qE = m4 −m3 (22c)
where ∆k′ = kn2 − kn1 −∆k1, and we can always find a ρ
and m1 satisfy equation (21a) , and m2,m3,m4 also can be
adjusted to satisfy equations (22a), (22b), and (22c). Then, let
∆k1 = ∆k2, and (22) may be rewritten as


∆kpE − qE = m2 −m1, (23a)
∆k′pE − (n2 − n1 − 1)qE = m3 −m2, (23b)
∆kpE − qE = m4 −m3 (23c)
From equations (23a) and (23c), we need m4−m3 = m2−
m1, thus we rewrite (23) again as

∆kpE − qE = m2 −m1, (24a)
∆k′pE − (n2 − n1 − 1)qE = m3 −m2, (24b)
m2 −m1 = m4 −m3 (24c)
Lastly, from (24a) and (24b), we can get the solutions to pE
and qE ,
pE =
(n2 − n1 − 1) (m2 −m1)− (m3 −m2)
(n2 − n1 − 1)∆k −∆k′ (25)
and
qE =
∆k′(m2 −m1)−∆k (m3 −m2)
(n2 − n1 − 1)∆k −∆k′ (26)
then, from equation (17) and (18), we have
RE = RB − pEc
∆f
(27)
and
θE = arccos
(
cos θB − c
fcd
· qE
)
(28)
We can get an illegal distance RE and direction angle θE by
substituting (25) and (26) into (27) and (28), respectively. In
such an illegal position, the confidential signals transmitted
by the two pairs of adjacent antennas are phase aligned to
generate a constructive energy superposition, which means that
an energy peak is formed and an about 6B array gain can be
achieved. This will enable eavesdropper to intercept easily.
Similarly, when there are more pairs of adjacent antennas
5with the same subcarrier index spacing, they may have a
positive superposition of confidential signal power at some
illegal position, which may bring a serious secure problem.
Concluding the above discussion, we have the following
theorem
Theorem 1: To achieve an excellent SPWT per OFDM with
single energy main peak and several very weak several side
peaks severely corrupted by AN, the corresponding chosen
subcarrier indices should be placed along transmit antenna di-
rection at Alice following the three rules: random, distributed,
and unequally-spaced.
IV. PROPOSED TWO EFFICIENT SPWT SCHEMES WITH
RANDOMIZATION PROCEDURE
In this section, we first propose two new RSISs: QSS
and PSS with conventional LSS as a performance reference.
Then, a RP is proposed to randomize the mapping from
subcarriers to transmit antennas by prime modulo operation,
and block interleaving. Combining RP with QSS, PSS, and
LSS generates three efficient SPWT schemes as follows: QSS
plus RP, PSS plus RP, and LSS plus RP. Finally, we derive
the closed-form formulas of the three schemes.
A. Three methods of constructing RSSs
Below, three sets of random subcarrier indices are con-
structed as follows: linear subcarrier set (LSS), quadratic
subcarrier set (QSS), and prime subcarrier set (PSS). After
this, we can choose NT subcarriers from one of them and
map them onto NT transmit antennas. The first RSIS is the
LSS as follows
SL = {kl |kl = al+ b, kl ∈ K} (29)
where a and b are positive integers. The value of a actually
has an important impact on the size of set SL. Given a fixed
value of b, increasing the value of a will reduce the number
of elements in this set. Conversely, decreasing its value will
increase the number of elements in this set. The second RSIS
QQS is defined as follows
SQ =
{
ks
∣∣ks = as2 + bs+ c, km ∈ K} (30)
where a, b, and c are also positive integers. Unlike LSS, the
subcarrier index along transmit antenna array is a non-linear
function of the corresponding antenna index. The final RSIS
PSS is defined as
SP = {kp |kp is a prime number, kp ∈ K} (31)
where
K = {kn |kn = n, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , NS − 1} (32)
where set SP consists of all primes of not exceeding NS − 1.
In other words, set SP stands for all subcarriers with their
indices being primes. In general, Ns is far larger than NT .
The above three methods has a common property that sub-
carrier indices along antenna direction are in increasing order.
This order will yield a receive energy mountain, which will
be shown in Section V. This will result in a serious security
issue. For example, if eavesdropper moves to any position on
this mountain, it will readily intercept confidential messages
intended for Bob. How to combat this secure challenging? In
the next subsection, we will introduce a RP, which will make
its effort to destroy the regular order and make a very random
subcarrier index distribution over transmit antennas. This will
form a SHEMP at Bob, but in other undesired positions only
several weak small energy peaks are immersed in AN energy.
B. Proposed RP
Given any RSIS shown in Subsection A, for example SP ,
NT subcarrier indices are chosen from it to form a set K as
K = {k1, k2, . . . , kNT } (33)
Definition 1. Random metric: To measure the random degree
of a random subcarrier set, let us define the following random
metric
δI =
1
NT − 1
NT−1∑
i=1
(
∆Ki − ∆¯K
)2
(34)
where ∆Ki is the subcarrier index spacing between a pair of
two adjacent antennas i and i+ 1 , and ∆K is the vector of
adjacent antenna subcarrier index spacings as follows
∆K = [| KT1 −KT2 |, . . . , | KTNT −1 −KTNT |] (35)
where
∆¯K =
1
NT − 1
NT−1∑
i=1
∆Ki (36)
Observing the definition in (34), a large δI means that the
subcarrier spacing distribution along antenna array is more
random, expanded, and distributed. It is very clear that we
firstly find a threshold δIT . The predefined threshold δIT can
be attained by machine learning a large amount of samplings
or training data set by randomly choosingNT subcarriers from
SP or SP . When the subcarrier spacing vector K satisfies
δIf > δIT , where δIT is the predefined threshold, it means the
KT is an effective subcarrier index vector, that is, what we
need.
First, this set is partitioned into p subsets, and represented
as
K ′ = K ′0 ∪K ′1 . . . ∪K ′p−1 (37)
where K ′n(n = 0, . . . , p − 1) is a subset with its elements
being congruent to be n modulo p, where prime number p is
chosen to be a large prime being less than
√
NT , that is
K ′n = {k ∈ K | k ≡ n(mod p)}, n = 0, . . . , p− 1 (38)
where k ≡ n(mod p) means that k and n has the same
remainder under modulo-p operation. At the same time, all
elements in each subset are arranged in an increasing order.
Now, we will permute the element order in the setK ′ by block
interleaving tool. To implement block interleaving, a J × I
rectangle array is first constructed as shown in Fig.3. Then,
we place all elements in set K ′ into this array one by one.
Considering that it is possible that NT 6= JI , we sometimes
need to add NT − JI zeros in the front part of the final row
of this array such that it is filled completely. Also, the values
of I and J are devised to satisfy the inequality
6Fig. 3. Block interleaving.
(J − 1)I < NT < JI (39)
As shown in Fig.3, this scheme inserts zeros to K ′ and then
the following interleaving operation will disorder the sequence
of the origin selected subcarrier indices more efficiently. From
Fig.3, the nth row of the first N − 1 rows of A is given by
Arn = [k
′
(n−1)I+1, . . . , k
′
nI ], n = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1. (40)
and for convenience, we make the last row with added zeros
as
ArJ = [0, 0, . . . , 0, k
′
(J−1)I+1, . . . , k
′
NT
]. (41)
Next we get a new subcarrier index sequence KT after
randomization by rewriting A as
KT = [Ac1
T , Ac2
T , . . . , AcI
T ] (42)
where Acn , n = 1, 2, . . . , L is the n-th column with zero
elements removed. This is the zero-padding block interleaving
operation. This method can efficiently randomize the origin
sequence so that a sufficient randomization sequence is formed
to achieve a SPWT. In practice, we need to perform several
block interleaving operations until the random metric is larger
than a predefined threshold to reach a full randomization of
subcarriers along antennas.
C. Secure performance analysis
In Subsection A, three sets, SL, SQ, and SP , of subcarrier
indices are presented. Their cardinalities are ML, MQ, and
MP , respectively.
For LSS, the possible ways of choosing NT from ML
subcarriers is as follows
CNTML =
ML!
(ML −NT )!NT ! (43)
Similarly, we have the possible ways for QSS
CNTMQ =
MQ!
(MQ −NT )!NT ! , (44)
For the convenience of analysis below, a, b and c in (30) are
taken to be one, zero and zero, respectively.
Then, the number of elements in QSS is
MQ = ⌊
√
NS⌋ (45)
Substituting the above value in (44) yields
CNTML =
⌊√NS⌋!(⌊√NS⌋ −NT )!NT ! , (46)
With regard to PSS, using the following approximate ex-
pression concerning the number of primes not exceeding MP
MP ≈ NS
lnNS
(47)
in number theory [31], we have the possible ways of PSS
CNTMP =
MP !
(MP −NT )!NT ! (48)
In general,
MP ≈ ⌊ NS
lnNS
⌋ > MQ = ⌊
√
NS⌋ (49)
for NS > 2. Thus, we conclude that the number of combi-
nations or patterns from PSS is greater than that from QSS.
For LSS, by adjusting the value of a and b, the total number
of combinations can be made to be larger or smaller than
those of PSS and QSS. In fact, a large value means a more
secure transmission. In a practical SPWT network, in order to
decrease the interception probability, the desired transmitter
transmits confidential messages with a very low power along
each subcarrier such that all SNRs per subcarriers at receivers
including desired and undesired are less than 0dB. For an
eavesdropper, it is very hard for him or her to decide which
subcarriers are used to transmit confidential messages in order
to intercept confidential messages. In other words, he should
know the transmit subcarrier pattern. However, due to an
extremely low receive SNR per subcarrier, Eve only obtains
the associated subcarrier pattern by guessing. For Bob, a large
transmit antenna array gain is achieved at receiver by SPWT,
and can reach a good detection performance. A large number
of subcarrier patterns or combinations available imply that
she has an extremely small probability to make a successful
interception. The probability of interception for LSS is given
by
PL =
1
CNTML
=
(ML −NT )!NT !
ML!
. (50)
In a similar way, we have
PQ =
1
CNTMQ
=
(MQ −NT )!NT !
MQ!
, (51)
and
PP =
1
CNTMP
=
(MP −NT )!NT !
MP !
. (52)
7Due to the fact MP ≫ MQ , as the NS trend to large, it is
very obvious
PQ =
(⌊√NS⌋ −NT )!NT !
⌊√NS⌋!
>> PP =
(
⌊ NSlnNS ⌋ −NT
)
!NT !
⌊ NSlnNS ⌋!
.
(53)
However, the value of PL is intimately related to the values
of a and b. Its value may be larger or smaller than those of
QSS and PSS. Below, we make an conclusion about the above
results as the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Interception probability formulas of three
RSSs: Three random subcarrier sets, LSS, QSS, and PSS have
the following interception probabilities:
PL =
(ML −NT )!NT !
ML!
, (54)
PQ =
(MQ −NT )!NT !
MQ!
, (55)
and
PP =
(MP −NT )!NT !
MP !
, (56)
respectively.
Observing the three interception probability formulas in
Theorem 2, we easily find that the anti-interception perfor-
mance will be gradually enhanced by increasing the number
NS of total subcarriers provided that the number NT of
antennas at Alice is fixed. This is mainly due to the fact that
the values of ML, MP , and MQ increase as NS increases.
Finally, we complete this section by presenting a flowchart
as shown in Fig. 4. In particular, it is noted that the above
three schemes, QSS plus RP, PSS plus RP, and LSS plus RP,
follow the steps shown in Fig. 4.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of our proposed methods,
system parameters in our simulation are chosen as follows: the
carrier frequency fc = 3GHz, the number of total subcarriers
N = 1282 = 116384, α1 = α2 = 0.5, the number of antenna
array element NT = 120, Ps/δ = 10dB, the antenna element
spacing d is half of the wavelength (i.e., d = c/2fc), and the
position of Bob is at (60◦, 500m).
Fig.5 illustrates the 3-D performance surface of SINR versus
direction angle θ and distance R of LSS without RP. From
this figure, it is seen that the SINR of LSS will have a
high energy ridge or mountain chain extending to infinity.
If eavesdropper locates on this ridge, then it can intercept
confidential messages. This will generate a serious security
issue. Thus, this LSS scheme without RP should be avoided
in practical applications.
To solve the secure problem of the LSS without RP in Fig.5,
we combine LSS and RP to form LSS plus RP. Fig.6 shows
the 3-D performance surface of SINR versus direction angle θ
and distance R of LSS plus RP. From this figure, it is seen that
the secure performance are significantly improved, but there
still are two lower energy side peaks outside the desired main
Fig. 4. Block diagram for the proposed RP.
peak, which will still lead to a secure issue if the eavesdropper
locates on the two lower side peaks, and can still receive a
good quality of confidential signal. In other words, the LSS
plus RP cannot completely solve the secure issue. Below, we
will turn to QSS and PSS.
Fig.7 plots the 3-D performance surface of SINR versus
direction angle θ and distance R of QSS without RP. From
this figure, it is seen that the SINR of QSS will also have
a high energy ridge or mountain chain extending to infinity
although it performs better than LSS. This will also generate
a security issue. Thus, this QSS without RP should also be
avoided in practical applications.
Similar to LSS, we also introduce RP to QSS, Fig.8 plots the
3-D performance surface of SINR versus direction angle θ and
distance R of QSS plus RP. After RP, compared with Fig.7,
the secure performance have been improved greatly, and there
exists only several very weak energy side peaks outside the
energy main peak. Compared to the main peak, their energy
can be omitted. The best value of side peaks is about one sixth
of the main peak. Obviously, the QSS plus RP can achieve a
SPWT.
8Fig. 5. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of LSS
without RP.
Fig. 6. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of LSS plus
RP.
Now, we move to PSS. Fig. 9 demonstrates the 3-D SINR
performance surface of PSS without RP. Obviously, the same
secure problem also exists in PSS without RP. Similar to LSS
and QSS, it also has a high energy ridge or mountain chain.
To combat this secure problem, Fig. 10 demonstrates the 3-
D SINR performance surface of PSS plus RP. Observing this
figure, it is seen that there is only one high signal energy peak
of confidential messages formed at desired position. Several
weak side peaks are also presented outside the main peak, but
their peak values are far lower than that of the main peak. By
our coarse measurement, their peak values are only one tenth
of the main peak value.
In what follows, we will make a comparison of their
interception probabilities. Fig.11 demonstrates the curves of
intercept probability versus the number NS of total subcarriers
of LSS plus RP, QSS plus RP, and PSS plus RP with NT = 16.
We can find that their interception probabilities decrease with
increasing the value of NS . The interception probability of
Fig. 7. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed QSS without RP.
Fig. 8. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed QSS plus RP.
QSS plus RP is the worse one among the three schemes
due to the fact that the number of subcarrier indices in
QSS are smaller than those of LSS and PSS. Furthermore,
with regard to LSS, reducing the subcarrier spacing between
two adjacent antennas will increase the number of possible
chosen subcarriers. This will also increase the size of LSS,
and accordingly decrease the interception probability. In other
words, the anti-interception performance is improved.
Fig.12 illustrates the curves of interception probability ver-
sus the number NT of antennas of LSS, QSS, and PSS with
NS = 1000. It is shown that as NT increases, the interception
probability of LSS and PSS has improved gradually, but the
interception probability of QSS is a convex function ofNT due
to the fact that the number of total subcarriers is limited and
increasing the value of NT will reduce the possible selectable
subcarrier patterns. At the same time, the anti-interception
performance of LSS improves as the subcarrier spacing of LSS
9Fig. 9. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed PSS without RP.
Fig. 10. 3-D surface of SINR versus direction angle and distance of the
proposed PSS plus RP.
decreases. In summary, the LSS can achieve an excellent anti-
interception performance provided that the subcarrier spacing
is chosen to be small enough. In general, PSS is in between
LSS and QSS. QSS is the worst anti-interception performance.
In summary, from Fig. 5 to Fig. 10, we find some basic facts
as follows. QSS plus RP and PSS plus RP have a less energy
leakage compared with LSS plus RP. Via RP, there still exists
two high energy side peaks for the LSS plus RP. For QSS
and PSS, after RP operation, outside the main peaks, there
are several very weak energy peaks, which can be neglected
compared to the main peaks. The most important fact is that
RP actually converts confidential energy mountain into a high
confidential energy main peak, and reduces energy leakage.
Observing Figs. 11 and 12, we also find that the interception
probability of PSS plus RP is between QSS plus RP and
LSS plus RP. Considering the two faces, it is evident that the
proposed PSS plus RP make a good balance between SPWT
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and anti-interception performance. The proposed schemes QSS
plus RP and PSS plus RP will pave a way for the near future
applications of SPWT.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, to achieve a practical SPWT, two SPWT
schemes are proposed: QSS plus RP, and PSS plus RP. First,
we derived some necessary conditions for SPWT by number
theory. From analysis and derivation, it follows that a random,
distributed, and non-equidistant subcarrier pattern placed on
transmit antenna array is preferred. Then, three random sub-
carrier sets are presented: LSS, QSS, and PSS. The later two
sets are proposed by us. At the same time, the random metric
is defined to measure the degree of randomization of subcarrier
pattern along antenna direction. Following this, a RP scheme
is proposed to implement a true SPWT. The RP includes
modulo operation, ordering, and block interleaving. From the
analysis and simulations, our proposed two methods perform
better than LSS plus RP in terms of security, where security
10
implies a less energy leakage and a formed single energy
main peak with several weak side peaks omitted. By analysis
and simulation, we also find that the proposed PSS plus RP
has a better anti-interception performance compared to QSS
plus RP. Although the LSS plus RP can achieve the lowest
interception probability among the three schemes by reducing
the subcarrier spacing, it will result in a serious energy leakage
outside the main peak, which yields a serious secure issue.
In summary, it is very obvious that the proposed PSS plus
RP can strike a good balance between energy leakage and
anti-interception performance. The proposed SPWT schemes
provide an attractive alternative secure solution to the future
satellite communications, unmanned aerial vehicle, and 5G
and beyond networks.
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